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Empirical evidence shows that larger firms pay higher wages than smaller ones. This 
wage premium is called the firm size wage effect. The firm size effect on wages may be attributed 
to many factors, as differentials on productivity, efficiency wage, to prevent union formation, or 
rent sharing. The present study uses quantile regression to investigate the firm size wage effect. 
By offering insight into who benefits from the wage premium, quantile regression helps eliminate 
and refine possible explanations. Estimated results are consistent with the hypothesis that the 
higher wages paid by large firms can be explained by the difference in monitoring costs that large 
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Empirical evidence shows that larger firms pay higher wages than smaller ones. 
This wage premium is called the firm size wage effect. The firm size effect on wages may 
be attributed to many factors. It may be true that workers hired by large firms are more 
productive than those hired by small firms (Brown and Medoff, 1989; and Evans and 
Leighton, 1989). It may be more difficult to monitor the labor force at large firms; this 
may make employers willing to pay higher wages to guarantee an efficiency wage (Oi, 
1983; Akerlof, 1984; Yellen, 1984; and Kruse, 1992). Large firms may pay higher wages 
than smaller ones because they want to prevent union formation (Kahn and Curme, 1987; 
and Donohue and Heywood, 2000); they may even be able to share their profits with 
workers (Brown and Medoff, 1989; Oi and Idson, 1999). In fact, each of these factors 
could contribute partially to the differences observed between wages paid by large and 
small firms. The present study uses quantile regression to investigate the firm size wage 
effect. By offering insight into who benefits from the wage premium, quantile regression 
helps eliminate and refine possible explanations.  
A common problem that investigators face when studying wage formation is the 
heteroscedastic behavior of the wage distribution (Brown and Medoff, 1989). Following 
Evans and Leighton’s (1989) suggestion, Oi and Idson (1999) tried to divide the sample 
into different classes to lessen this effect. Quantile regression accomplishes a similar task 
in a more efficient way, using all the information available from the total sample
1.  All 
the observations are ultimately playing a role in the maximization problem that defines 
the choice of the estimated parameters at each quantile. However, the weights that these 
observations have over the total function varies according the target conditional quantile. 
Therefore, the outliers have smaller effects overall. 
Estimated results are consistent with the hypothesis that the higher wages paid by 
large firms can be explained by the difference in monitoring costs that large firms face. 
                                                 
1 “We have occasionally encountered the faulty notion that something like quantile regression could be 
achieved by segmenting the response variable into subsets according to its unconditional distribution and 
then doing least squares fitting on these subsets. (…) It is thus worth emphasizing that even for the extreme   3
Results also suggest that more highly skilled workers are more often found at larger 
firms. 
In the next section, I present and examine different theories of the firm size wage 
premium. Section 2 describes the data set to be used and presents demographics for the 
sample selected for use in this study. A succinct explanation of the quantile regression 
method and a comparison between the results of ordinary least squares and quantile 
regression are the subject of section 3. In addition, this third section analyzes the potential 
reasons for the existence of the firm size wage effect and what we can conclude based on 
the quantile regression approach. Finally, in the last section, I summarize the results and 
note several conclusions. 
1 - Firm size wage premium theory and applications  
Using data from Italian workingwomen in textile mills, Moore (1911) related the 
existence of a wage premium for those who work in larger plants. A plethora of 
subsequent studies have been conducted in order to investigate the motives large firms 
have for paying higher wages to their employees. From the skills differences among 
workers to rent sharing and avoidance of unions’ formation, different explanations have 
been offered and empirically tested. However, consensus has not yet been reached. In 
order to understand how each explanation can be linked to the firm size wage premium, 
this section examines the main models and theories used in several previuos studies. 
Before entering into an explanation of the firm size wage premium, a modeling of 
the firm size distribution is valuable. Lucas (1978) based his model of the firm size 
distribution on the study of Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979)
2. His model is specific to 
closed economies, with a fixed amount of capital and labor, which is homogeneous with 
respect to workers’ productivity. The innovation of his study is the inclusion of a variable 
called management talent for each individual. Lucas assumes that the management talent 
of an entrepreneur determines the achievable firm size. 
                                                                                                                                                 
quantiles all the sample observations are actively in play in the process of quantile regression fitting.” 
Koenker and Hallock (2001). 
2 Calvo and Wellise (1980) use the Lucas model to incorporate age and learning effects.    4
Suppose there is a closed economy with N units of labor and K units of 
homogeneous capital. The combination of these factors yelds Y units of homogeneous 
output. The key assumption of the Lucas’ model is the existence of a continuum of 
agents, with their talent following a Γ distribution. Functions n(x) and k(x) describe the 
endowments for each individual x. Given their abilities, each person chooses to be an 
entrepreneur or a worker. Individuals who have potential profits as entrepreneurs, π, that 
are higher than the competitive market wage rate, w, will comprise the management. 
Those with lower ability earn more as employees than they would as managers, and 
therefore they are the workers class.  Consider z>0 as the cutoff point, from which 
individuals decide if they are able to be managers or workers. One key assumption of his 
model is the separation between the production technology, represented by f(n,k), and the 
managerial knowledge, the x g [ f , k ]
3. 
Giving a constant return technology,  ( ) n
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  The solution to Equation (1) gives the multipliers w, the equilibrium wage rate, 
and  u, marginal return of capital. The entrepreneur income comes from the residual 
                                                 
3 Here, x represents the managerial skill and g is the span of control over it.   5
between the revenue subtracted from the total wages and total capital rent, 
mathematically expressed by 
) ( ) ( ))] ( ), ( ( [ x uk x wn x k x n f xg − −  (2) 
Maximization of Equation (2) permits the determination of the optimal firm size. 
Using the first-order condition in relation to capital, we have 
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Equation (4) shows that the ratio of factor prices determines the capital-labor ratio 
for the firms. Substituting Equation (4) into Equation (3), we have 
  u r r x n g x = ′ ′ ) ( )] ( ) ( [ φ φ  (5) 
The implicit function n(x,w,u), that is the optimal level of employment. Using the 
cutoff value z and that  ) ( ) ( z rn z k =  for all managers: 
  ) ( ) ( )] ( ) ( [ z n ur w w r z n zg + + = φ   (6) 
Equation (6) is a zero profit condition: average cost = price. Using this condition, 
that is based on the production factors prices, managerial talent and the production 
function, it is possible to determine the optimal firm size by its level of employment, n.  
Oi (1983) extends the Lucas model to suggest that, besides the management talent 
of the entrepreneur, monitoring costs influence the achievable firm size. Each manager 
has to solve the following equation: 
  ) ( hN H H T − = = λ λ  (7) 
where T is the manager production, λ is the manager ability, and H is the result of the 
fixed time endowment minus the total time required to monitor workers. Therefore, an 
increase in the number of workers, N,  will cause a decrease in the total manager 
production, since an increase in workers means an increase in the time the manager 
spends monitoring them.   6
Equation (7) determines the optimal firm size. This size depends both on the 
entrepreneur’s management talent and the time required to monitor workers. Factors λ 
and h, the time required to monitor each worker, establish the manager production and set 
limits on firm growth. Oi explicitly derives how the substitution of labor by capital could 
decrease the need for monitoring and make an increase in firm size possible. 
Monitoring costs are one of the most cited reasons for the firm size wage 
premium. Workers who have more ability would require less monitoring, and therefore 
lower costs. By this reasoning, they would deserve better wages. Empirical evidence 
shows that larger firms hire workers who are more able. Therefore, the difference in their 
abilities, which influences monitoring costs, would result in higher remuneration of their 
work compared to small firms’ workers. 
The efficiency wage theory can also be linked to the monitoring problem. 
According to this theory, workers would receive wages higher than the optimal 
competitive level and can be monitored with less cost. The cost of involuntary 
unemployment, raised along with wages, discourages employees shirking even without 
close monitoring. Akerlof (1984) presents different paradigms that justify efficiency 
wages. The most elaborate is the dual labor market hypothesis (Doeringer and Piore, 
1971). Suppose the economy supports two types of jobs: the primary and the secondary 
sectors. The primary sector workers are well remunerated, have stability, low quit rates, a 
schedule of promotions, and investment in their human capital. The secondary sector 
counterparts suffer the opposite: low wages, instability, high quit rates, little chance of 
promotion, and low human capital investment. Since workers prefer the primary sector, 
but its opportunity is not available to all of them, the wage paid by the primary sector is 
higher than the competitive wage. However, the higher wage acts as an efficiency wage 
for workers who do not want to be forced into a secondary sector job, and guarantees 
worker productivity without high levels of monitoring.  
Gibbons (1992) presents the efficiency wage hypothesis the light of game theory. 
Suppose there is a repeated game in which firms have to set wages and workers decide 
how much effort to spend on their professional activities. A given firm offers wage w
*   7
and the worker can accept it or remain self-employed. Given his/her acceptance, the next 
step is to decide the amount of effort this worker will supply. The optimal effort is 
defined by the present value of the worker’s payoff: 
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where e is the level of worker’s effort, and δ  is the discount rate. If the worker shirks and 
is caught, then he/she will lose his/her job and receive a lower wage forever
4. There is a 
probability (1 – p) of being caught shirking. Therefore, the present value of shirking is: 
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The worker’s optimal behavior is to supply effort if  S e V V ≥ , so the present value 
of supplying effort matches or exceeds the present value of shirking. This decision 
depends on the probability of being caught and the wage offered. Therefore, firms should 
offer not only wages that compensate workers for his/her self-employment and disutility 







δ , that makes shirking 
more costly to workers, given the possibility of losing his/her job. 
Another explanation for higher wages at larger firms is the tendency toward 
avoiding workers’ unionizing. There is some evidence that employers prefer to concede 
more benefits to their workers to prevent the formation of unions, because unions may 
lead to more difficult negotiating conditions over regular and overtime schedules of 
work, increase of wages, etc. Therefore, it is believed that some part of the firm size wage 
effect is related to avoiding unionization. 
Brown and Medoff (1989) test this hypothesis. They believed that, if preventing 
unionization was a relevant aspect of firm size wage differentials, then this effect should 
be reduced for workers with a low probability of seeking unions. They verify that there is 
no significant difference between these workers and those with a higher propensity to 
seek unions. They conclude that, although efforts to avoid union formation are 
considerable, their effects are not reflected in the firm size wage effect.   8
Kahn and Curme (1987) argue that lower wage workers receive more benefits 
because firms fear unions. These workers have a higher propensity to join unions, since 
unions increase wages and reduce wage dispersion. Using CPS data, Kahn and Curme 
find evidence that, under union threat, nonunion wage dispersion decreases, implying that 
the lower end of wage distribution is the major beneficiary of this threat. Donohue and 
Heywood (2000) use the same methodology as Kahn and Curme (1987) and incorporate 
the hypothesis that workers support union formation only if they believe their 
employment conditions, i.e. to continue to be employed at the same or better level, will 
be sustained. Donohue and Heywood question whether low-wage workers have lower 
marginal productivity and, therefore, would be the first to be dismissed in the case of 
union formation. Their empirical findings partially support the view that the firm size 
wage premium derives from avoidance of union formation. For the higher and lower ends 
of the wage distribution, unions are not a positive influence on wages or employment, 
respectively.  
Several authors
5 verified that wages paid in the same establishment are positively 
correlated. If in some establishment, blue-collar workers receive wages above the 
average, white-collar workers will also receive higher remuneration. This positive 
correlation would imply that firms with higher ability to pay prefer to share their rents. 
Katz and Summers (1989) use data from 74 industries to measure the negative 
correlation between wages and quit rates. They argue that the industry wage structure can 
be explained by labor rents. In this case, the firm size wage effect is the representation of 
the ability of wealthier employers to pay higher wages. 
A final explanation for the firm size wage premium is the working conditions 
differential between larger firms and smaller ones. Larger firms may be more likely 
associated with adverse working conditions. The dissociation of the labor force from the 
entire production process is considered to cause larger losses in the utility of those 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 By assumption, a worker has the possibility of working at this unique firm or being self-employed. 
5 Slichter (1950), Katz and Summers (1989), and Weiss (1966), for example.   9
working
6. Working in larger firms could make it more difficult to meet people and build 
relationships with them, since larger firms can create a more impersonal work 
atmosphere. A way to test this hypothesis is to include information about employees’ 
levels of pleasure in working
7 or including very detailed occupational variables. Brown 
and Medoff (1989) do not find evidence to support the working conditions hypothesis.  
In the next sections, I will present the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Quantile 
Regression estimates of the firm size wage premium. Using the 1999 CPS and the 1998 
NLSY, I will test and analyze the hypotheses presented in this section. The hypothesis of 
paying a wage premium to avoid unionization will be tested by the inclusion of a union 
indicator. If this inclusion modifies significantly the firm size or/and plant size variables, 
a share of the explanation may be attributed to this cause. The rent sharing, the working 
conditions and the workers ability differential theories will be tested by the inclusion of 
industries and occupations indicators. Better the specification of the wage equation, lower 
is expected to be the firm size wage effect. Using the NLSY98 data, the ability   
differential among workers will be tested using the variable ASVAB, which represents 
the respondents results to the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery. Finally, the 
monitoring cost idea will be analyzed in the light of the descriptive characteristics of the 
quantile regression method. Having different magnitudes and significance levels for the 
different quantiles may indicate returns specifically for the workers who deserve higher 
or lower degree of monitoring on their work. For instance, it will be seen on the next 
sections, when analyzing the CPS99 results, that the lower conditional quantiles receive 
higher returns for firm size than the upper quantiles. This result may be indicating that the 
workers who deserve more monitoring, the ones located at the lower quantile, receive an 
efficiency wages.  
                                                 
6 Usually, microeconomics considers leisure as a good and work as the opposite. However, in practice, 
workers can increase their level of utility by doing something they like. Inability to control the whole 
process of production is generally considered to decrease the utility of work. An alternative way to 
understand this effect is by considering that work always causes disutility. Still, the dissociation of the 
entire process causes a larger disutility to the worker. 
7 The CPS does not include questions referring to this aspect of working.   10
2 - Data and Demographics 
Two datasets are used in the present study: the Current Population Survey (CPS) 
and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). The latter database has fewer 
observations and a more restricted sample than the former, since it includes only persons 
that were between 14 and 21 years old in 1979, however some of its features are relevant 
to this investigation, such as its panel structure and more specific questions.  
The U.S. Census Bureau conducts the Current Population Survey (CPS) monthly. 
It interviews over 50,000 households and gathers information on various areas of interest 
such as: education, labor force status and participation, demographics, and others. The 
sample used in the present study is the March 1999 Survey. Although this study uses only 
the March 1999 Survey, the March files have existed since 1962 and they contain the 
Annual Demographic File and the Income Supplement. While the March file has changed 
some of its questions over the years, different years of the March file are recommended 
for wage analysis because this series combines demographic information
8 and details 
about labor force participation
9. The March 1999 CPS file is especially interesting for the 
present study since it contains a specific firm size variable, divided in six categories: 
fewer than 10 employees, between 10 and 24 employees, between 25 and 99 employees, 
between 100 and 499 employees, between 500 and 999 employees, and 1,000 or more 
employees.  
Table 1 presents some demographic information for the sample. The first column 
describes the most general sample. It contains 29,513 observations for men, between ages 
20 and 60, inclusive. The average individual is 39 years old, with an annual income of 
39,067 dollars. He is white, completed high school, and is married. A large portion of the 
sample, 39.5%, works in a firm with 1,000 or more employees. The second column 
restricts the sample to full-time workers
10 and those who were engaged in the labor force 
for at least 48 weeks per year. In this second sample, 24,233 men are included. Age, race, 
                                                 
8 For instance: age, race, education, marital status, residence area, etc. 
9 Such as: wages, industry, occupation, firm size, etc. 
10 Full time workers are the ones who work at least 35 hours per week.   11
educational profile, and firm size participation remain similar to those in the first sample. 
The average annual income, increased as expected, to 43,614 dollars per year. 
Finally, the sample that will be used in this investigation restricts the individuals 
to those who earn at least 4 dollars per hour and are not top coded by their income
11. The 
variable hourly wage is constructed by dividing annual wage and salary income by the 
number of hours usually worked per week multiplied by the number of weeks worked last 
year
12. This sample is based on 23,292 observations of men between 20 and 60 years old, 
inclusive, full-time workers, and who worked during at least 48 weeks in the year before 
the interview. The average individual in this sample is 39 years old, white, married, and 
did not complete a college degree. The mean hourly wage in the sample is $18.75. 
Firm size is a variable is divided into six categories, according to the total number 
of employees in all organization plants
13. As cited before, the categories are: fewer than 
10 workers, 10 - 24 workers, 25 - 99 workers, 100 - 499 workers, 500 - 999 workers and 
1,000 or more workers
14. In the final sample, roughly 37% of the respondents work for 
firms with fewer than 100 employees. The majority of the other 63% of the sample work 
for firms with 1,000 or more employees (41%). 
The National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) is a study sponsored by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. It is composed by a set of surveys designed to gather information at 
several points in time on the labor market experiences of diverse groups of men and 
women. From the six NLS samples, the one used in this study is the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), with a sample of boys and girls that were 
                                                 
11 The importance of restricting the wages to those equal or higher to some minimal amount, in this case, 
four dollars, is to avoid errors in the answers. The majority of observations that were dropped had declared 
themselves to earn less than 7,000 dollars per year from wages and salaries and to work more than 35 hours 
per week, 48 weeks per year. I. e., to be full time workers who receive much less than the minimal wage. 
684 observations were dropped because they had computed wages that were abnormally low. Concerning 
top coded observations, only 257 individuals declared receiving wages and salaries above the maximum 
wage declarable by CPS. Regressions were made including them and results are similar to the ones 
presented here at all.  
12 This calculation results in the hourly wage. The same method is used in other studies, for example Evans 
and Leighton (1989). 
13 Evans and Leighton (1989), and Oi and Idson (1999) report results with the inclusion of a plant size 
variable. This variable does not exist for the March files.  
14 These categories are valid after 1992. From 1962 to 1991, there were only 5 categories. The first one was 
“less than 25 workers”.   12
between 14 and 21 years old on the last day of 1978. The investigation of the 
respondent’s labor force performance and attachment, and education and training 
investment are the main purposes of the NLSY. However, its actual content is much 
broader than that, including questions about military participation, vocational aptitude, 
school performance, alcohol and substance use, fertility, and child care. 
For the present paper, three points about the NLSY must be highlighted. First, the 
NLSY contains variables that measure the implicit ability of each person in its sample. 
The NLSY respondents were tested following the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude 
Battery (ASVAB) criteria
15. Either the results of these tests can be used to capture the 
ability of the respondent on specific subjects, or the raw and percentual scores may be 
used to obtain a measure of the respondent’s “abilities” on general matters.  This feature 
of NLSY is important to this study, since it constitutes the only variable that actually 
captures differences in workers implicit abilities. The inclusion of the ASVAB variable in 
the last specification of the wage equation indicates if the usual measures of skills make 
some difference on the wage differentials between firms of dissimilar sizes.   Second, the 
panel structure of the NLSY may help to seize another kinds of influences that may lead 
to the firm size wage differences. Using panel data, a specific variable relative to each of 
the respondents is included in the regression and eliminates doubts about unobserved 
personnel differences influencing wage’s formation. The panel structure of the NLSY 
helps the understanding of the same factor as the ASVAB variables. However, results 
differ since the use of a specific variable is different from the analysis made by the use of 
each individual response over time. The panel structure captures a lot more than the 
ability differences between each individual. It also computes personnel differences that 
cannot be sized by a particular variable. Finally, the NLSY contains two variables on the 
size of firms. One is the number of employees at the plant where the respondent works. In 
contrast to the CPS, the NLSY reports the actual number of employees, instead of an 
indicator variable. The other variable is an indicator for the size of the firm, which is also 
                                                 
15 The ASVAB consists of a battery of tests that measure knowledge and skill in the areas of general 
science; arithmetic reasoning; word knowledge; paragraph comprehension; numerical operations; coding   13
informative. This variable assumes a value of 1 if the whole firm has more than 1,000 
employees and zero otherwise. Therefore, using the NLSY data it is possible to infer both 
the plant size and the firm size effect over wages, which cannot be made using the 
CPS99, which does not contain a plant variable. 
Table 2 reports the demographics for the NLSY98. Once more, the sample is 
restricted to men, however restrictions about income and hours of work are not made, 
since the number of observations is much lower than in the CPS sample. This youth 
sample is based on 1,919 observations of men between 34 and 41 years old, inclusive. 
The average individual in this sample is 36.7 years old, white, married, and did not 
complete a college degree. The mean hourly wage
16 in the sample is $17.96. The average 
number of workers at each plant is more than 2,000, and the majority of the sample works 
for firms with 1,000 or more employees (60.7%). 
3 - Ordinary least squares and quantile regression: the empirical evidence 
Much attention has been devoted to the firm size wage effect. Different methods 
and various datasets can be used with the same objective. While some authors use data 
from individuals or from firms to investigate the firm size wage effect, there is a more 
recent trend of using employer-employee matched data to do the same thing
17. Although 
this is a valuable approach, the present paper will rely entirely on employee answers to 
investigate firm size, and it will be comparable with Brown and Medoff (1989), Evans 
and Leighton (1989) and Oi and Idsen (1999). 
Using data from individuals
18 and establishments
19 separately, Brown and Medoff 
(1989) test the main hypothesis about the firm size wage effect. Using ordinary least 
squares estimation and appropriate corrections for unspecified heteroskedasticity, they 
conclude that the firm size wage effect exists even when grouping individuals by specific 
                                                                                                                                                 
speed; auto and shop information; mathematics knowledge; mechanical comprehension; and electronics 
information. See NLSY79 User’s Guide for more detail. 
16 NLSY reports the hourly wage. 
17 Haltiwanger, Lane, Spletzer, Theeuwes and Troske (1999) present a compilation of papers with 
estimatives concerning the firm size wage effect from matched data.  
18 As the Current Population Survey (CPS) and Quality of Employment Survey (QES). 
19 Namely: the Survey of Employer Expenditures for Employee Compensation (EEEC), the Wage 
Distribution Survey (WDS), and Minimum Wage Employer Survey (MWES).   14
characteristics (e.g., union status, industry), and that the effect comes both from the plant 
and from the firm size. They conclude further that the effect derives mainly from the 
higher quality of the workers, because they are not able to confirm the effects of 
unionization, better working conditions, higher ability to pay, smaller supply of labor or 
elevated monitoring costs that might have motivated the higher wages in larger firms.  
Evans and Leighton (1989) use both the May 1983 CPS and the 1981 data from 
the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) of Young Men to investigate the same effect. 
Their conclusions, based on ordinary least squares regressions and first differences 
estimators, are that the firm size wage effect exists and that the plant effect can be 
neutralized by properly controlling for the total number of employees at all sites. They 
also suppose that the reason larger firms pay higher wages is a matter of how they 
evaluate workers’ characteristics; i.e., larger firms recruit workers with higher degrees of 
education and training, and the firm size wage effect is derived from this selection of 
workers.   
Based on 1993 CPS data, Oi and Idson (1999) use a different approach to 
investigate the effect of firm size on wages: the bivariate association between firm size 
and selected variables. They estimate that a man with selected characteristics could earn 
an additional 45.2% working in a firm with 1,000 or more employees as he would have 
earned if he worked in a firm with fewer than 25 employees. Using the May 1983 CPS, in 
order to control for small and large establishment size, they conclude that the wage 
difference between larger and smaller firms could decrease to 27.8% if adequate controls 
are added.   
These three studies conclude that the firm size wage effect exists and, for lack of 
stronger evidence toward another factor, that this difference between wages is generated 
by the higher skills of larger firms’ workers. My paper will develop the idea of wage 
formation along the lines of these three previous studies.  
The main innovation of this study is the use of quantile regression. By using this 
method, it will be possible to investigate the firm size wage effect along the conditional 
distribution of wages. The following sub-section reviews the ordinary least squares   15
results and compares them with the findings from previous studies. After that, the second 
sub-section describes the quantile regression method and results. 
3.1 - Ordinary least squares results 
The objective of this paper is to better understand the effect of firm size on wages. 
The sample is restricted to men; between 20 and 60 years old, inclusive; full-time 
workers, i.e. working at least 35 hours per week; and those who were engaged in the 
labor force for at least 48 weeks during the year that precedes the CPS interview. 
Restrictions were also made by dropping individuals who earn less than four dollars per 
hour or are top coded by their wage and salaries’ income
20. The estimation of a wage 
equation based on two different methods, namely ordinary least squares and quantile 
regression
21, follows Equation 10: 
     ε γ ϕ φ δ β α + + + + + + = ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑





















i i FirmSize Occ Ind Z X wage  (10) 
where: 
Xi represents age, age squared, indicator variables for race (Categories: white, 
black, and others. The excluded category is “white”.), education (Categories: less than 
high school, high school degree, college dropouts, vocational degree, college degree, 
graduate degree, with the excluded category “less than high school”.), and marital status 
(Categories: never married, married, separated, divorced, widowed. The excluded 
category is “married”.); 
Zi  represents indicator variables for central city status (indicator variable that 
equals 1 if the person resides in a central city (SMSA) and zero otherwise), region of 
residence (Categories are: northeast, north central, south and west. The excluded category 
is “south”.), and union membership (indicator variable that equals 1 if the person is 
member of a union and zero otherwise); 
Ind represents two-digit industry; 
Occ represents one digit occupation; 
                                                 
20 See Table 1.   16
FirmSize represents firm size indicators with 6 categories
22, with the excluded 
category “fewer than 10 employees”. 
Following the suggestions of Brown and Medoff (1989), the indicator for union 
membership, and the industry and occupation indicators were included one at a time, 
each inclusion representing a new specification. Results from a basic regression 
compared with the estimations that include the union indicator may shed light on the 
suspicion that large firms pay larger wages to prevent unionization of their workers. The 
additions of industry and occupation indicators imply a more direct control for labor 
quality, i.e. workers’ unmeasured ability, and particular trends of specific industries and 
occupations. Table 3 presents the results for these three specifications. 
Not much difference can be seen between the estimated coefficients from the 
alternative specifications. The return to the variable age, of approximately 5%, is positive 
and significant for all regressions. The concave behavior of the wage profile, is 
confirmed by the coefficient of age squared, which is negative and significant in all 
specifications. Expected results are reached for the race and education indicators. White 
males earn from 8 to 20% more than non-white males, while education has a positive and  
increasing return. Indicators for marital status show that married men, the excluded 
category, are better remunerated than non-married men
23. 
The inclusion of the union membership indicator does not change the firm size 
indicators’ estimated coefficients. Being a union member, as suggested by previous 
papers, has a positive effect on wages. 
The final estimation in Table 3 is the most complete mean wage equation. 
Inclusion of industry and occupation categories does not alter the magnitude of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
21 Quantile regression coefficients and confidence intervals were estimated using S-Plus Package. The OLS 
results were estimated in Stata. 
22 The categories are:   1=fewer than 10 employees,  
2=10-24 employees,  
3=25-99 employees,  
4=100-499 employees,  
5=500-999 employees and  
6=1,000 employees or more in all locations. 
Excluded category: 1 = less than 10 employees.   17
coefficients on the demographic, residential, and union indicator very much. 
Nevertheless, there are some differences concerning the firm size wage premium. In 
columns 1 and 2, the firm size indicator for firms with 10 to 24 employees revealed a 
wage effect of 9%
24 in relation to those working in firms with fewer than 10 employees, 
the excluded category. The larger firm size indicator, i.e. for firms with more than a 
thousand employees, had an effect of 22%. Column 3 shows a stable estimated 
coefficient in the firm size wage effect for the category of firms with 10 to 24 workers of 
9%, however, there is a decrease in the effect for larger firms employees, from 22 to 
20%.  
The NLSY98 was used to estimate the model specified in Equation (10). Given 
particular characteristics of these data, four specifications were tested. The first one 
includes age, age squared, indicator variables for race (Categories: white, black, and 
others. The excluded category is “white”.), education (Categories: less than high school, 
high school degree, college dropouts, college degree, graduate degree, with the excluded 
category “less than high school”.), and marital status (Categories: never married, married, 
separated, divorced, widowed. The excluded category is “married”.); and indicator 
variables for central city status (indicator variable that equals 1 if the person lives in a 
central city (SMSA) and zero otherwise), region of residence (Categories are: northeast, 
north central, south and west. The excluded category is “south”.). To deal with the plant 
and firm size wage effects, two variables were included. The first one is the logarithmic 
value of the actual number of employees at the plant where the respondent works
25. To 
deal with the firm size, an indicator for firms that have more then 1,000 employees was 
included. 
                                                                                                                                                 
23 Several papers direct attention to the subject of wage differences between married and non-married men 
in the U.S. For example, see: Korenman and Neumark (1992), and Waite (1995).  




β , where  i β ˆ  is the estimated coefficient for each firm size category.
 
25 Alternative regressions using the actual number of employees as the plant size, instead of the logarithmic 
of this value, were tried. Results remain similar, however the use of a logarithmic transformation is more 
intuitive, given that the larger the plant size, the lower the impact of an additional worker to the plant size 
wage effect. Since NLSY allows the quantification of employees, the use of a logarithmic transformation is 
welcome.   18
Following the same pattern revealed by the CPS99 results, not much difference 
can be seen between the estimated coefficients of the alternative specifications presented 
in Table 4. However, the significance of some variables varies widely between 
regressions. For instance, the variables age and age squared follow the expected behavior 
only in the first specification, the baseline regression. In the more complete version, the 
one that includes an ability measure, neither of these variables is significant. Concerning 
race, education and marital status, NLSY regressions reinforce the CPS results, where 
white males earn more than non-white males, education has a positive increasing return, 
and married men receive higher wages than non-married men. 
The inclusion of the union membership indicator does not significantly change 
either the plant size variable or the firm size indicator’ estimated coefficients. Being a 
union member, as suggested by previous papers, has a positive effect on wages. 
The third estimation in Table 4 is the one that includes occupation and industry 
indicators in the wage equation. Inclusion of industry and occupation categories changes 
the magnitude of the coefficients of the education, union indicator (lower), and plant size 
variables. The plant size wage effect that was more than 2% decreases to 1.5% after this 
latter inclusion of variables. The effect on the firm size indicator does not change 
significantly. 
The last column of Table 4 presents the results for the most complete estimation 
of the wage equation. The fourth specification includes a variable that measures the 
percent scores on the ASVAB test, described in the previous section. This variable was 
included with the intention of measuring part of the ability differential among 
respondents, and, with this, to separate this effect from the plant and firm size wage 
effects. Besides the unexpected results on the age and age-squared variables, the 
estimated coefficients for the other variables remain similar. Results for the plant size and 
firm size variables do not change much either in magnitude or significance. The plant 
size wage return is 1.4% and, the firm size, is roughly 5%. 
Overall, ordinary least squares results confirm the previous findings of the 
existence of the firm size wage premium and encourages the use of a new approach to   19
clarify reasons for the firm size wage premium. Linear regression cannot support or 
disprove some explanations that focus on preventing union formation, efficiency wage 
premiums, or employee monitoring, given the available variables from the data set. 
Differences in workers’ abilities are the only explanations that can be currently assessed 
using the ordinary least squares regressions, particularly by the inclusion of occupation 
and industry indicators, and the ASVAB results, in the NLSY sample. A brief description 
of the quantile regression approach and its advantages compared to the linear regression 
follows, along with the description of results. 
3.2 - Quantile regression approach and results 
One of the challenging points of this study is the econometric tool used to analyze 
the firm size wage effect: quantile regression. Using the same principles that make the 
ordinary least squares result in the conditional mean estimation, Koenker and Bassett 
(1978)
26 introduced quantile regression as the estimator of the conditional quantile 
function. This innovative approach brings not only more explanatory power to the results 
when compared to the details captured by the least squares approach, but also decreases 
the influence of outliers in the estimations. 
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Equation (11) results in the conditional mean function E(Y|x). Quantile regression 
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26 See also Koenker and D’Orey (1987), Koenker and Portnoy (1996), Buchinsky (1999), and Koenker and 
Hallock (2001). Novo (2000) has an intuitive and straightforward application.   20
  Using linear programming methods, Equation (12) results in the conditional 
quantile functions. The ρ represents a loss function that can be calculated conditioned to 
each selected quantile τ , where  ( ) 1 , 0 ∈ τ
27.  
Some benefits of quantile regression are especially interesting in the present 
study. Its low sensitivity to outliers is one. In the linear squares regression, the failure of 
the normality assumption, especially with outliers that result in a long-tail distribution, 
results in a poor estimation of parameters. Quantile regression estimations, imposing 
different weights on observations according to the quantile to be estimated, are robust 
even for cases with a distribution far from Gaussian. A second plus of quantile regression 
is its descriptiveness. OLS regression estimators, as a conditional mean estimation, 
present a result for the average point. Quantile regression opens the possibility of 
multiple estimators for the same variable depending on the targeted quantile. 
These two advantages of quantile regression over OLS estimation have been 
highlighted for their importance in the present study. Even with the increased number of 
observations in the sample to be investigated, the income distribution does not follow a 
normal distribution. The presence of outliers and their influence on the estimations can be 
seen in the next section. The level of descriptiveness achieved by quantile regression 
helps us answer fundamental questions. For instance, quantile estimations are very good 
at answering the question of which workers benefit most from large firms’ employment. 
A final note about how to interpret the estimated coefficients: as in the OLS 
regression the interpretation of the coefficients is made by evaluating the partial 
derivative of the dependent variable, Y, with respect to one of the regressors, Xi.  In 
quantile regression, the procedure is the same; only now, the partial derivative is of the 
conditional quantile of the dependent variable in relation to one of the independent 






, where τ represents the 
targeted quantile. However, the reader should keep in mind that the observation 
                                                 
27 Robust standard errors are available to each quantile using the modified Barrodale and Roberts (1974) 
method, as described in Koenker and D’Orey (1987).   21
belonging to the  quantile − τ in one conditional distribution may not belong to the same 
quantile with changes in its covariates (Buchinsky, 1998). 
The wage equation, Equation (10), was estimated using the procedures explained 
in the previous section. Table 5 and Figures 1 - 3 present the results for the firm size 
indicators of the CPS99 sample. Table 6 and Figure 4 present the results for the NLSY98 
sample
28, with regressions that include both the plant and firm size wage effects. For the 
both samples, the observable trend of decreasing return of plant and/or firm size, as the 
quantiles get higher, is the same for all sets of estimations; the variability is related to the 
confidence intervals in each specification. 
Concerning the CPS99 sample, the trend for all regressions is a higher wage 
return in relation to the firm size variable for the lower quantiles and a lower return, even 
zero return, for the higher ones. The lower quantile, the 5%, has a return of 19% for the 
second firm size category and more than 30% for the sixth firm size category. The 95% 
quantile, the highest one estimated, has no significant returns, positive or negative, for 
any of the firm size categories. Figure 5 tries to show in a more intuitive way the CPS99 
quantile regression results compared to the OLS estimations. Recall that the firm size 
variable is not continuous for the CPS, therefore we have one indicator variable for each 
different firm size category. On the vertical axes, we measure the firm size effect on 
wages. On the horizontal line we have the representation of the firm size variable, from 
firms that have between 10 and 24 employees, so called “firm size 2”, to firms with more 
than 1,000 employees, the “firm size 6”. The upper line represents the wage return to the 
firm size variable for the 5% quantile. The lower line represents the firm size wage return 
for the 95% quantile. This graph does not affirm that workers in larger firms receive 
lower wages than the ones at smaller firms. It is showing that the return to the firm size is 
larger for the workers belonging to the lower quantiles than for the ones workers on the 
higher conditional distribution.  
                                                 
28 Estimated coefficients for the other variables, for the samples of CPS99 and NLSY98, and results for 
regressions containing only the Plant Effect of the Firm Size effect are available upon request. Results do 
not change significantly from the ones presented here.   22
For the regressions that do not include occupation and industry indicators, 
specifications 1 and 2, the quantile regression results are significantly different from the 
OLS estimation for the majority of the quantiles. It is possible to notice that the return to 
firm size increases along with the number of employees that each category represents. 
For the category 2, firms with 10 to 24 employees, individuals belonging to the 5% 
quantile have wages 19% higher than the individuals in the same quantile that work for 
firms with fewer than 10 employees. For the 5% quantile, returns vary between 21%, for 
the category 3
29, to 37%, for the category 6, which includes firms with 1,000 or more 
workers. 
The closer the estimations get to the 75% quantile, the more the results from the 
quantile regression approach the ordinary least squares estimates. Returns vary between 4 
and 16% for this quantile, given each firm category in relation to the excluded one. At the 
95% quantile, neither one of the categories present positive or negative returns to the firm 
size indicators.  
The regression that includes occupation and industry indicators, specification 3, is 
different from the ordinary least squares estimation for the lowest and highest quantiles; 
however, for the middle quantiles, i.e., 50%, and 75%, results are not significantly 
different. Only for the firm size categories 4 and 6
30 are returns to firm size significantly 
different from linear regression results for the majority of the quantiles. For the latter 
category, workers in the lower quantile, 5%, have returns to firm size 34% higher than 
the individuals from the excluded category do. This return decreases as the quantiles get 
higher: for the 25% quantile, return is 29%; for the 50%, return is 26%; for the 75% 
quantile, return is 15%; and, for the higher quantile, 95%, the return is not significantly 
different from zero. 
The NLSY98 sample maintains the results reached by the previous related 
regressions on the CPS99 sample. Figure 4 presents the results. In this figure, one can 
notice that the plant size effect follows a pattern similar to the one presented by the firm 
                                                 
29 I.e., firms with 25 to 99 employees. 
30 I.e., firms with 1,000 or more employees.   23
size indicators on the CPS99 sample
31. There is a positive and significant plant size effect 
on the lower quantiles for the specifications 1 and 2 that is reduced to zero on the 95% 
quantile. An interesting result is that, on the latter specifications, the plant size effect is 
significant only for the middle and upper quantiles, not being significant for lower end of 
the conditional distribution. The firm size wage effect, presented at the right side of 
Figure 4, only is significant and positive for the middle quantiles in all specifications. 
Quantile regression estimations, by disaggregating the mean effect, make the 
analysis of the estimated results to be much deeper than when using OLS. A different 
return for each quantile in the same firm size category is inconsistent with the hypotheses 
of rent sharing and bad working conditions as possible explanations for the firm size 
wage premium.  If this wage premium came from firms able and willing to pay more for 
their labor force, as the rent-sharing hypothesis predicts, we would expect a surplus to be 
paid to the higher quantile in each category and we cannot verify that this happens. 
According to the results presented before, the higher conditional quantile receives no 
significant return to the firm size variable, using the CPS results, or receives a smaller 
return than the lower quantiles, using the NLSY data. Without that surplus, this 
explanation can be dropped.  
The suggestion that the firm size wage premium originates in bad working 
conditions is also not consistent with the findings. If worse labor conditions existed at 
large firms, all quantiles should receive a premium with an increase in firm size. 
However, the highest quantile, as described before, does not receive wage premiums at 
all. 
The explanation that larger firms pay higher wages to prevent union formation is 
also not sustained by presented estimations, neither by ordinary least squares, as in 
Brown and Medoff (1989), nor by the quantile regression approach. The inclusion of a 
variable related to union membership does not significantly alter results to the firm size 
indicators. Therefore, the present study is also inconsistent with this hypothesis. 
                                                 
31 It was suggested that the CPS firm size variable may be actually capturing the plant size instead of the 
number of employees at all locations. This cannot be tested here, however the NLSY98 results are 
consistent with this.   24
Many authors have cited differences in workers’ abilities as the cause for the firm 
size wage effect if no other explanation can be found in the estimated models. However, 
the true skill of a worker is an implicit measure. It is not adequate to measure skill by 
education achieved, because persons with the same degree of education may have very 
distinct skills. The effort that workers take to complete their tasks, which could also 
imply a difference in skills, is also not easily measured.  
Brown and Medoff (1989) use information about levels of responsibility as a 
measure of skill. They conclude that the firm size wage effect declines with an increase in 
skill level (for example, among white collar occupations such as managers and 
professionals). They also assume that any firm size wage effect stems from differences 
between large and small firms’ abilities to measure workers’ skills. This set of 
conclusions implies that blue-collar workers receive the premiums available at larger 
firms because their skills are more easily measured. In the present study, Figures 1-3 
show those workers in the lower conditional quantile of the wage distribution can achieve 
a large impact on their own wages by working at a large firm. Thus, results presented 
here are in accord with the previous literature. 
Although not the best way to measure skills or abilities, the differences between 
educational degrees in the firm labor supply is also used to this end. Evans and Leighton 
(1989) find evidence of higher skilled workers being employed at larger firms. They 
characterize ability by level of education and stability in a job. Table 7 presents the 
proportion and the frequency of workers at each degree of education classified by firm 
size based on the CPS sample
. Results are similar to those from previous studies:  the 
larger the firm, the larger the proportion of workers with college degrees or more. For 
firms with fewer than 10 employees, 29.7% of workers have college or graduate degrees. 
Firms with 1,000 or more employees have this estimative increased to 40%. The same 
rationale works for lower degrees of education as well. Only 6.2% of the workers who 
belong to a firm with 1,000 or more employees have less than a high school degree, in 
comparison to 17% for firms with fewer then 25 employees. Even if one chooses to   25
measure ability by the imperfect variable of educational degree, there is some indication 
that more highly skilled workers are allocated preferentially to larger firms. 
In the effort to better control for workers ability, the NLSY98 was used. Although 
it contains fewer observations than the CPS, this sample helps to explore whether better 
measures of workers ability change the conclusions, but can partially explain the 
difference on the wages among firms of different size
32. The introduction of the plant size 
variable showed that the upper conditional quantile has positive returns to it, even if the 
return to the firm size variable is not significant.  
As a final point, estimates shown in this paper suggest that the firm size wage 
premium can be partially explained as an efficiency wage to compensate for monitoring 
costs. Small firms can monitor their workers at lower costs than larger companies. 
Knowing this difference in the cost of monitoring, larger firms would pay larger wages to 
their employees in order to guarantee that they work efficiently with low supervision. As 
described in the first section, this efficiency wage both compensates workers for their 
lower supervision and imposes a larger penalty for those caught shirking. In addition, 
efficiency wage payment is an alternative for those firms whose monitoring costs are too 
high. The efficiency wage theory points out that workers who deserve more monitoring 
may receive higher wages as a way to incentive them to do their work better. 
The employees who typically have their work monitored are at the lower 
quantiles. These workers have a direct superior who controls their production. The 
workers at the upper quantiles have more independence in the way they can act; 
monitoring their work does not necessarily mean watching the way the person is working. 
Instead, results signal the quality of their work.  
The importance of quantile regression can be seen here. Using OLS, it is more 
difficult, if even possible, to conclude that low ability workers receive larger premiums 
for working in larger firms than workers at the opposite end of the distribution. The idea 
                                                 
32 Appendix A shows the results for 6 different specifications of a wage equation estimation based on a 
NLSY panel sample. The inclusion of variables that capture the particularities of each individual, as it does 
a fixed effect regression, may clear the effect of a plant and firm size wage effect. Considering that the 
sample used on those regressions is adequate, results indicate that individual unobserved abilities play a 
greater rule than the one that can be assumed by OLS and quantile regressions conclusions.   26
of dividing the sample between blue-collar and white-collar workers and estimating their 
wage effects
33 was intended to check for the same aspects that quantile regression 
presents. However, with quantile regression, a more efficient way to consider the total 
information from the sample is achieved, since it uses the information from the entire 
distribution to estimate the coefficients for every quantile. 
The results derived in this paper are consistent with at least two of the theoretical 
reasons discussed. The larger effects of the firm size wage difference apparently comes 
both from differences in workers’ skills and from higher monitoring costs at larger firms. 
Both of these factors are accepted by other authors and verified with the quantile 
regression approach. 
4 - Conclusion  
The previous literature has not been entirely successful at analyzing the possible 
reasons for the firm size wage effect. Empirical applications to deal with the subject were 
restricted to ordinary least squares regressions and the analysis of the partitioned sample 
by characteristics.  Brown and Medoff (1989) investigate different databases in a careful 
way with the objective of discovering the most influential causes of the firm size wage 
premium. They conclude that differentials between workers’ abilities are responsible for 
the greatest part of this wage premium. Oi and Idson (1999) gather conclusions from 
several authors, at different periods, and also conclude in favor of the higher abilities 
presented by large firms’ workers to justify the wage differential of these workers relative 
to those who are employed at small firms. Meanwhile, several authors argue in favor of 
avoidance of unions by large firms (Kahn and Curme, 1987), rent sharing (Katz and 
Summers, 1989), or efficiency wages (Akerlof, 1984; Yellen, 1984; and Kruse, 1992). 
The present study uses the Current Population Survey from March 1999 to investigate 
these hypotheses and employs an innovative technique for the analysis: the quantile 
regression approach. 
                                                 
33 Brown and Medoff (1989) proceed this way. Evans and Leighton (1989) suggest a similar idea.   27
The use of quantile regression improves the previous analyses by allowing more 
of the sample information in the estimation of each coefficient and at the same time 
estimates coefficients for different points of the conditional distribution. One of the 
advantages of quantile regression is its low sensitivity to outliers. Even when the sample 
fails to fulfill the normality assumption, quantile regression, imposing different weights 
to observations according to the quantile to be estimated, has robust estimators. A second 
benefit of quantile regression is its descriptiveness. Quantile regression, opens the 
possibility of multiple estimators for the same variable depending on the targeted 
quantile, and portrays the behavior of the estimation for different points of the variable 
distribution. In contrast with linear regression estimators, quantile estimations permit a 
profound knowledge of the sample characteristics, by supplying conditional estimated 
coefficients at selected quantiles.  
Skills or abilities are not easily measured, but with the available evidence, there is 
evidence consistent with the hypothesis that workers at large firms are better prepared to 
do their jobs. Monitoring costs are not explicit either. The conjunction of the results that 
better skilled workers are allocated to larger firms and that these workers receive 
differentiated wage premiums indicates that employees who deserve a higher degree of 
supervision
34 receive higher firm size wage premiums than the workers who do not need 
as much monitoring
35.  
Examination of the data and regression results, especially the results pointed out 
by the panel data regressions, shows that it is possible to support the ideas that the 
differentials in workers’ abilities and in the costs of monitoring play a relatively large 
role in the firm size wage effect. While the firm size wage premium varies from between 
19 and 37% for the 5% conditional quantile, depending on the firm size indicator 
analyzed, returns are not significantly different from zero for the 95% conditional 
quantile for any of the firm size indicators. Results from quantile regression and its 
conditional quantile analysis reinforce the arguments in favor of monitoring costs and 
                                                 
34 Usually the ones at the lower conditional quantiles. 
35 I.e., those at the higher conditional quantiles.   28
efficiency wages being paid by larger firms, and is not consistent with the hypotheses of 
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Table 1: Demographics CPS March 1999
(1) 
 Sample  1
(2)  Sample 2
(3)  Sample 3
(4) 
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Number of Observations  29,513  24,233  23,292 
Notes:   (1) Standard errors are in parentheses. 
  (2) Sample 1 composed by men, 20 to 60 years old, inclusive. 
(3) Sample 2 restricted to those who were full-time workers and worked at least during 48 weeks in the year before the 
interview. 
(4) Sample 3 restricted to those who earn 4 dollars/hour or more, and are below the income top code limit.   37
Table 2: Demographics NLSY 1998
 
 
 NLSY  98
(1) 
Age  36.70 
(.052) 
Race: (%)   
     White  .655 
(.011) 
     Black  .283 
(.010) 
     Others  .062 
(.005) 
Education Attainment: (%)   
     Less than High School  .089 
(.007) 
     High School Graduate  .439 
(.011) 
     Some College  .226 
(.010) 
     College Degree  .147 
(.008) 
     Pos-College Degree  .099 
(.007) 
 
Marital Status: (%)   
     Never Married  .191 
(.009) 
     Married  .630 
(.011) 
     Separated  .035 
(.004) 
     Divorced  .141 
(.008) 
     Widowed  .003 
(.001) 
 
Hourly Wage  17.96 
(.383) 
 
Plant Size  2,145 
(276.9) 
 
Firm Size Indicator  




Number of Observations  1,919 
Notes:   (1) Standard errors are in parentheses. 
    38
Table 3: Ordinary least squares results for wage regression (Equation 10)
(1)  
                CPS99 Sample 
  Specification 1
(2)  Specification 2
























































































































Occupation’s Indicators Included?  No  No  Yes 
Industries’ Indicators Included?  No  No  Yes 
Adjusted R-Squared  .317  .317  .376 
Number of Observations  23,292  23,292  23,292 
 Notes:   (1) Standard errors are in parentheses. 
  (2) Baseline Regression 
(3) Specification 2 includes the Union Membership Indicator in the Baseline Regression. 
(4) Specification 3 includes Occupations and Industries’ Indicators in the Specification 2.   39
Table 4: Ordinary least squares results for wage regression (Equation 10)
(1)  
                NLSY98 Sample 
 
  Specification 1
(2)  Specification 2
(3)  Specification 3










































































































ASVAB results  - - -  .003 
(.0005) 


























No No Yes  Yes 
Industries’ Indicators 
Included? 
No No Yes  Yes 
Adjusted  R-Squared .286 .297 .406 .418 
Number  of  Observations  1,919 1,919 1,919 1,919 
 Notes:   (1) Standard errors are in parentheses. 
  (2) Baseline Regression 
(3) Specification 2 includes the Union Membership Indicator in the Baseline Regression. 
(4) Specification 3 includes Occupations and Industries’ Indicators in the Specification 2. 
(5) Specification 4 includes ASVAB results variable in the Specification 3.   40
Table 5: Quantile regression results
(1)  - CPS99 sample 
  Specification 1
(2)  Specification 2
(3)  Specification 3
(4) 
Firm 2 (10-24 employees)      






























Firm 3 (25-99 employees)     






























Firm 4 (100-499 employees)     






























Firm 5 (500-999 employees)     






























Firm 6 (>1,000 employees)     






























Notes:   (1) Standard errors are in parentheses. 
  (2) Baseline Regression 
(3) Specification 2 includes the Union Membership Indicator in the Baseline Regression. 
(4) Specification 3 includes Occupations and Industries’ Indicators in the Specification 2.   41
Table 6: Quantile regression results
(a)  - NLSY98 sample 
Panel A: Inclusion of plant size and firm size variables 
  Specification 1
(b)  Specification 2
(c)  Specification 3
(d)  Specification 4
(e) 
Ln(Plant Size)       








































Firm Size Indicator         








































Panel B: Inclusion of only plant size variable 
  Specification 1
(b)  Specification 2
(c)  Specification 3
(d)  Specification 4
(e) 
Ln(Plant Size)       








































Panel C: Inclusion of only firm size indicator 
  Specification 1
(b)  Specification 2
(c)  Specification 3
(d)  Specification 4
(e) 
Firm Size Indicator         








































Notes:   (a) Standard errors are in parentheses. 
  (b) Baseline Regression 
(c) Specification 2 includes the Union Membership Indicator in the Baseline Regression. 
(d) Specification 3 includes Occupations and Industries’ Indicators in the Specification 2. 
(e) Specification 4 includes the ASVAB results in the Specification 3.   42
Table 7: Education distribution – CPS99 sample 
 
 
PANEL A: Percentual of workers at each category 
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APPENDIX A 
 
The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth has an additional feature that can be explored 
to understand better the firm size wage effect: its panel structure. Using the data from 
respondents that changed jobs between once during the period of 1986 and 1998, we 
estimated a fixed effect regression on six different specifications. Table A1 presents the 
results for these estimations. 
Columns 1 and 2 show the results for regressions that included both the plant size 
variable
1 and the firm size indicator
2. Results differ on these columns by the inclusion of 
occupations and industries indicators on the regression presented on column 2
3. Columns 
3 and 4 present the results for specifications that include only the plant size variable, 
without occupations and industries, and with them, respectively. Finally, columns 5 and 6 
bare results for the estimations with firm size variable only. Once again, the former 
presents estimation results without the inclusion of the occupations and industries 
indicators and, the latter, with these additions. 
The common point to all estimations is that neither the plant size nor the firm size effects 
are significantly different from zero. This result may indicate that what the literature calls 
firm size wage effect is the implicit ability among workers. Larger firms may be more 
capable to hire workers that are more talented and, for this reason, they pay higher wages 
to their labor force. 
Because the panel sample used here is too restricted, both in the number of observations 
as in the sample selected, results may be analyzed with prudence. Additionally, quantile 
estimations for panel samples were not made on this study. Future developments of this 
paper will include the analysis of both subjects and, luckily, will clarify these 
conclusions.  
                                                 
1 Following the previous estimations, the plant size variable is the logarithmic transformation of the actual 
number of workers at the respondent’s plant. 
2 Which is the indicator that assumes value 1 if the total number of workers at all firm locations is equal of 
greater than 1,000 and zero otherwise.  
3 The union membership variable was not included on these regressions because it would reduce too much 
the number of observations, since the question that originates was first asked on 1988.   44



















































































No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Industries 
Indicators ? 

























        
Categories  1,213 1,213 1,213 1,213 1,213 1,213 
#  Observations  3,281 3,281 3,281 3,281 3,281 3,281 
Notes: 
1)  Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
2)  S1 uses both the Ln(Plant Size) and Firm Size Indicator. 
3)  S2 uses both the Ln(Plant Size) and Firm Size Indicator. 2-Digit Industries and 2-Digit 
Occupations indicators are included. 
4)  S3 uses only the Ln(Plant Size). 
5)  S4 uses only the Ln(Plant Size). 2-Digit Industries and 2-Digit Occupations indicators are 
included. 
6)  S5 uses only the Firm Size Indicator.  
7)  S6 uses only the Firm Size Indicator. 2-Digit Industries and 2-Digit Occupations indicators are 
included. 